This edition of Gibson Dunn’s Federal Circuit Update for October summarizes the current status of petitions pending before the Supreme Court and recent Federal Circuit decisions concerning standing, jurisdiction, recusal, and the meaning of “by another” under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102.~~Federal Circuit News~~Supreme Court :~~The Supreme Court granted the petition in Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. (US No. 25-250) as we summarized in our September 2025 update.  Oral arguments were heard on November 5, 2025.~~Noteworthy Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari :~~There were a couple potentially impactful petitions filed before the Supreme Court in October 2025:~~We provide an update below of the petitions pending before the Supreme Court, which were summarized in our September 2025 update:~~Upcoming Oral Argument Calendar~~The list of upcoming arguments at the Federal Circuit is available on the court’s website.~~Key Case Summaries (October 2025)~~US Inventor, Inc. et al. v. PTO, No. 24-1396 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025):  US Inventor filed a petition for rulemaking proposing certain limitations on the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)’s authority to institute inter partes review (IPR) and post grant review (PGR).  The PTO denied the petition, reasoning that it overlapped with a then-pending request for comments on a rule regarding the PTO’s discretion to institute IPR and PGR.  US Inventor sued the PTO for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and America Invents Act (AIA) by denying its rulemaking petition without sufficiently explaining its denial and without promulgating notice-and-comment rulemaking.  The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of associational standing because US Inventor’s theory of injury was too speculative.~~The Federal Circuit (Reyna, J., joined by Lourie and Stark, JJ.) affirmed.  The Court explained that “[a]dvocacy organizations like appellants have associational standing if . . . [inter alia] ‘at least one of their members would have standing to sue.’”  The Court determined that US Inventor failed to allege that at least one of its members had standing to sue because none of its members suffered a non-speculative injury-in-fact from the PTO’s denial of the petition for rulemaking.  Specifically, the Court determined that US Inventor’s alleged harm based on the PTO’s institution of a third party’s petition, which would result in potential cancellation of appellants’ members’ patent claims, was speculative and insufficient for standing.~~IQE, PLC v. Newport Fab, LLC et al., No. 24-1124 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025):  IQE makes wafer products used in semiconductors.  Newport et al. (collectively referred to as Tower) are semiconductor manufacturers that make specialized integrated circuits that utilize said wafers.  IQE shared information with Tower under a mutually binding non-disclosure agreement when the parties began discussing a potential collaboration.  While discussions were ongoing, Tower filed patent applications directed to porous semiconductor technology that IQE alleges it developed.  IQE sued Tower asserting several state and federal causes of action relating to the alleged theft of trade secrets and a claim for correction of inventorship on the patents.  Tower moved to dismiss and filed an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation)[1] motion to strike several of IQE’s claims, arguing that Tower’s use of confidential information to file the patent applications was petitioning activity protected by the First Amendment.  The district court denied the motion.~~The Federal Circuit (Hughes, J., joined by Stark and Wang (district judge sitting by designation), JJ.) remanded the case for further proceedings.  Because there was not yet a final judgment from the district court, the Court first had to decide whether the denial of Tower’s anti-SLAPP motion was immediately appealable.  The Court explained that the collateral order doctrine is an exception to the rule of finality, and an interlocutory appeal is allowed when a trial court’s order affects rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal.  The Court then determined that Federal Circuit law, and not Ninth Circuit law, applied in this case because it was a question of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.  The Court concluded that the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike under California law is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine in part because the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion would be unreviewable on appeal after final judgment as Tower would already have had to litigate the case.~~Centripetal Networks LLC v. Palo Alto Networks Inc., No. 23-2027 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2025): Palo Alto Networks filed an IPR challenging claims of Centripetal’s patent directed to technology for detecting network threats in encrypted communications.  A Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) panel, including Administrative Patent Judge McNamara, instituted the IPR.  After the Board instituted IPR, Cisco joined the proceeding.   Centripetal later learned that Judge McNamara owned Cisco stock and filed a motion requesting recusal of the entire panel and vacatur of the institution decision, asserting that Judge McNamara’s stock ownership cast a shadow over the whole panel.  Judge McNamara disagreed that regulations required his recusal, but he nonetheless withdrew as did one of the other judges on the panel.  They were replaced by two new judges and the new panel denied Centripetal’s motion to vacate, calling the arguments frivolous and finding the request untimely.~~The Federal Circuit (Cunningham, J., joined by Moore, C.J. and Hughes, J.) vacated and remanded.   The Court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding the recusal motion untimely.   The Court explained that Centripetal was aware of Judge McNamara’s stock holdings, but sat on the conflict for more than three months and only raised recusal concerns after it received unfavorable decisions.  The Court also noted that the unique setup of the Board and the compressed timeline “heightens the need to raise conflicts at the first opportunity.”~~Merck Sorono S.A. v. Hopewell Pharma Ventures, Inc., Nos. 25-1210, 25-1211 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2025):  Hopewell filed IPR petitions challenging Merck’s patents directed to methods for treating multiple sclerosis (MS) by orally administering cladribine.  The Board determined that all challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious over prior art references, Bodor and Stelmasiak.  The Board rejected Merck’s argument that Bodor did not qualify as prior art because it had one inventor in common with the patent at issue, and therefore, was not a publication “by another” as required under 35 U.S.C. § 102.~~The Federal Circuit (Linn, J., joined by Hughes and Cunningham, JJ.) affirmed.  The Court explained that “for a reference not to be ‘by another,’ and thus unavailable as prior art under pre-AIA § 102(e), the disclosure in the reference must reflect the work of the inventor of the patent in question.”  The Court explained that when the patented invention is the result of the work of joint inventors, the disclosure must reflect the collective work of the “same inventive entity” to be excluded as prior art.  The Court further stated that “[a]ny incongruity in the inventive entity between the inventors of a prior reference and the inventors of a patent claim renders the prior disclosure ‘by another,’ regardless of whether inventors are subtracted from or added to the patent.”~~[1] Under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, if a cause of action “aris[es] from any act . . . in furtherance of [a] person’s right of petition or free speech,” the court shall strike the cause of action unless “the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”~~The following Gibson Dunn lawyers assisted in preparing this update: Blaine Evanson, Jaysen Chung, Audrey Yang, Hannah Bedard, Vivian Lu, Julia Tabat, and Michelle Zhu.~~Gibson Dunn’s lawyers are available to assist in addressing any questions you may have regarding developments at the Federal Circuit. Please contact the Gibson Dunn lawyer with whom you usually work, any leader or member of the firm’s Appellate and Constitutional Law or Intellectual Property practice groups, or the following authors:~~Blaine H. Evanson – Orange County (+1 949.451.3805, bevanson@gibsondunn.com) Audrey Yang – Dallas (+1 214.698.3215, ayang@gibsondunn.com)~~Appellate and Constitutional Law: Thomas H. Dupree Jr. – Washington, D.C. (+1 202.955.8547, tdupree@gibsondunn.com) Allyson N. Ho – Dallas (+1 214.698.3233, aho@gibsondunn.com) Julian W. Poon – Los Angeles (+ 213.229.7758, jpoon@gibsondunn.com)~~Intellectual Property: Kate Dominguez – New York (+1 212.351.2338, kdominguez@gibsondunn.com) Josh Krevitt – New York (+1 212.351.4000, jkrevitt@gibsondunn.com) Jane M. Love, Ph.D. – New York (+1 212.351.3922, jlove@gibsondunn.com)~~© 2025 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.  All rights reserved.  For contact and other information, please visit us at www.gibsondunn.com.~~Attorney Advertising: These materials were prepared for general informational purposes only based on information available at the time of publication and are not intended as, do not constitute, and should not be relied upon as, legal advice or a legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. Gibson Dunn (and its affiliates, attorneys, and employees) shall not have any liability in connection with any use of these materials.  The sharing of these materials does not establish an attorney-client relationship with the recipient and should not be relied upon as an alternative for advice from qualified counsel.  Please note that facts and circumstances may vary, and prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.~~Download PDF~~