Georgia personal injury attorney R. Shane Lazenby is hoping to revive a class-action sought against Cambre & Associates attorneys accused of engaging in the illegal solicitation practice of case-running.
Three weeks after receiving an unfavorable Georgia Court of Appeals ruling, counsel with Cook Law Group and Mahaffey Pickens Tucker petitioned the Supreme Court of Georgia for a writ of certiorari on Lazenby's behalf.
'Does Not Establish Civil Liability'
(Top, l-r): Matthew E. Cook, Kate S. Cook, and Nathan R. Nicholson of Cook Law Group in Gainesville, Georgia. .(Bottom, l-r): Joshua L. Bearden and Jonathan L. Greer of Cook Law Group in Gainesville, Georgia, and Gerald Davidson, Jr. of Mahaffey Pickens Tucker in Lawrenceville, Georgia. Courtesy photos
Lazenby is represented Matt Cook, Kate S. Cook, Nathan R. Nicholson, Joshua L. Bearden and Jonathan L. Greer of Cook Law Group in Gainesville and Mahaffey Pickens Tucker of Counsel Gerald Davidson Jr. in Lawrenceville.
Lazenby's complaint alleged Cambre & Associates, founding partner Glenn T. Cambre Jr., attorney of counsel Hannah Moore and firm affiliate Erwin Minley engaged in weekly case running—an allegedly illegal practice of soliciting automative tort plaintiffs before their police reports are made public.
When Gwinnett County State Court Judge Carla E. Brown denied the defendants' motion to dismiss Lazenby's complaint, a challenge to the Georgia Court of Appeals led to an oral argument in June.
As appellant counsel with Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith in Atlanta argued that Lazenby lacked standing to bring claims of infringement of a property right and violation of the Georgia RICO Act, appellee counsel with Cook Law Group countered that Lazenby had established sufficient proximate cause to support his claims.
READ: 'Caught Red-Handed': Lawyers Accused of 'Case Running'
Five months after the oral argument session, the intermediate appellate court issued a decision siding with the defendants.
According to the Nov. 3 opinion drafted by Judge Elizabeth Gobeil, Gobeil and Presiding Judge Anne Elizabeth Barnes agreed Lazenby’s claims had not met legal standards.
"Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that, 'while the Code of Professional Responsibility provides specific sanctions for the professional misconduct of the attorneys whom it regulates, it does not establish civil liability of attorneys for their professional misconduct, nor does it create remedies in consequence thereof,'" the opinion read. "Likewise, violation of a criminal statute does not give rise to a civil right of action unless the statute specifically provides for such a right. None of the statutes that the Defendants allegedly violated explicitly provide for a private right of civil action."
The judicial majority deemed the facts alleged in support of Lazenby's RICO claim as being "simply too attenuated and speculative to form the proximate cause of the supposed financial losses theoretically incurred by Lazenby and others similarly situated."
READ: Georgia Court of Appeals Nov. 3 Opinion
However, Judge Jeffrey A. Watkins disagreed that Lazenby’s allegations of lost profits due to the defendants' alleged actions had been insufficient to establish a direct connection to the predicate acts.
"To the extent the majority appears to conclude that the only targeted or intended victims of the defendants' conduct in this case are the accident victims whose personal data was accessed, I think their view is too narrow," Watkins wrote. "Importantly, the RICO statute itself provides that '[a]ny person whose property or person is injured by reason of a violation of any provision of this article may sue therefor and recover for any damages sustained and the costs of suit.'"
READ: 'Literally Ambulance Chasing': Case Running Lawsuit Dismissed on Appeal, Changes in Lawmakers' Hands
'Attorney's Property Right'
Following the Georgia Court of Appeals reversal, Lazenby appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
In a 38-page petition for writ of certiorari filed on Nov. 24, Lazenby's counsel challenged the intermediate appellate court's majority conclusion that Brown erred in denying Cambre & Associates' motion to dismiss Lazenby's complaint. Petitioner counsel contended the panel improperly limited what could be considered as a property right for attorneys.
"The Court of Appeals' new definition of an attorney's property right to practice as only encompassing relationships with existing clients or licensure issues is in conflict with other decisions of the Court of Appeals to the extent it attempts to narrow such a right without reason," petitioner counsel briefed. "Further, the holding misses the point of Defendants' criminal scheme: to steal potential clients and guarantee that Plaintiff has no chance of forming a relationship with such clients. The holding also fails to acknowledge this is an 'infringement' on Plaintiff's right to practice law in a gainful way."
Petitioner counsel maintained that the defendants had impaired Lazenby's "right to be free from [their] illegal competitive practices."
"At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff's assertion of the loss of these clients and fees—to which Defendants are not entitled—is sufficient harm to the proposed class's property right to compete lawfully for this business and confers standing because Plaintiff's enjoyment of his right to," petitioner counsel continued.
READ: Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Lazenby also challenged the Court of Appeals' finding that the accident victims whose data had been accessed constituted the only injured parties.
"To limit the application of Georgia's RICO statute to situations where, even as the intended target and direct victim of a scheme, one cannot recover unless he is the intended target of a predicate act is to ignore the command of the General Assembly and to read requirements into Georgia’s RICO act that do not exist," petitioner counsel briefed. "This distinction also makes sense, as often times, a person will be the intended victim and target of a scheme of acts while never being the 'target' of any single underlying criminal act."

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